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One of the major advantages of being the world’s only superpower, as the U.S. was for 
much of the last twenty years, is that the U.S. was the only country strong enough to be 
able to have influence across the globe.  A major disadvantage which confronts the U.S. 
is that because of its power, it has to be concerned about what happens more or less 
everywhere across the globe.  Over the last decades, the U.S. has maneuvered itself into a 
position where virtually every country is important and every region is strategically 
vital.  There are some exceptions to this, notably in Africa, but that too is changing.  This 
began with the global struggle of the Cold War, but has continued well beyond that 
conflict. 
To some extent this is inevitable in an age when the biggest security threats to the U.S. 
come from terrorist networks with global reach and where climate change and economic 
crises affect all parts of the world.  Nonetheless, the extent of U.S. commitment 
everywhere, which was once a sign of the American ascendancy, now bears many signs 
of being part of America’s decline.  This will likely become more apparent and 
problematic if the economy does not recover.  As local and national governments are 
stressed and basic domestic needs become more and more difficult for governments to 
afford, it is likely that voices calling for a more modest foreign policy with fewer 
commitments abroad will be stronger, but policy makers will find it very difficult to turn 
that aspiration into reality. 
Faced with enduring economic problems it is not unreasonable for Americans to question 
the nature and extent of their country’s commitments overseas.  The sentiment that the 
U.S. should focus on creating jobs, building infrastructure and providing services 
domestically before seeking to pursue a state building agenda overseas is powerful.  It is 
made more powerful by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are now among the 
longest in American history, and which are not likely to be concluded any time soon.  If 
this sentiment turns into a political force, it could be significant. 
Turning this political force into policy will be extremely difficult because the U.S. is so 
entrenched in so much of the world and because our reasons for being so deeply involved 
have been well honed for decades.  Thus a simple question which might have arisen, for 
example, from Secretary of State Clinton’s recent trip to the South Caucasus such as why 
does the U.S. care what political system Armenia has or whether or not the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict gets resolved, which might be raised by an advocate for a less engaged 
foreign policy, can be met with detailed and thorough answers including issues of energy 
security, limiting Russian influence, support for the struggle against terrorism and the 
 2 
like.  These answers are not just rationalizations as they reflect the complex global web of 
American interests and commitments. 
The need for an internationalist and indeed interventionist foreign policy has nonetheless 
become something of a self-fulfilling prophecy.  It seemingly based on a logic that 
suggests we need to have a presence throughout the world because if not we won’t have a 
presence in various parts of the world, but the story has been fleshed out so that this line 
of argument is reasonably accurate. 
The U.S. has backed itself into a corner where it has to care about every corner of the 
planet even if it cannot afford to and would rather pursue a dramatically different foreign 
policy.  The illogic of the situation is that relatively sound explanations can, and are, 
offered to explain why a particular country, region, conflict or problem is of critical 
import to the U.S.  However, these individual explanations contribute to a foreign policy 
framework that is increasingly constricting and burdensome for a country that has lost the 
luxury to not be involved. 
